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The 25th Anniversary of the Summary Judgment
Trilogy: Much Ado About Very Little
Linda S. Mullenix"

I. INTRODUCTION

The twenty-fifth anniversary of the Supreme Court's famous
summary judgment trilogy' provides an excellent opportunity to reflect
on the legal profession's ability to overstate, overhype, and overinflate
the impact of Supreme Court decisions. This certainly would seem to
be true for predictions concerning summary judgment practice that were
issued in the immediate aftermath of the Court's 1986 decisions in
Celotex, Anderson, and Matsushita.
Famously, members of the academy and other legal seers opined that
the Supreme Court, in issuing the summary judgment trilogy, was
telegraphing a message to federal judges to make enhanced usage of
summary judgment to expedite legal proceedings and to intercept and
dismiss factually deficient litigation before trial. The not-so-veiled
purpose of the summary judgment trilogy, then, was to nudge federal
judges out of their normal predisposition against summary judgment.
Consequently, a number of procedural wags predicted that federal
courts would witness a surge of summary judgment dismissals in the
wake of the trilogy.
However, as the Federal Judicial Center's ("FJC") numerous
empirical studies have shown, the summary judgment trilogy has had
scant impact on judicial reception to enhanced utilization of summary
judgment as a means to streamline litigation. 2 Simply stated, the trilogy
* Morris & Rita Atlas Chair in Advocacy, University of Texas School of Law. I am indebted
to Mr. Ryan Goodland, Class of 2013, who conducted the underlying research and empirical data
collection for this Article.
1. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-27 (1986) (clarifying the shifting allocations of
burdens of production, persuasion, and proof at summary judgment); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 257 (1986) (applying heightened evidentiary standard of proof in libel action
to judicial assessment of propriety of summary judgment) Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 596-98 (1986) (holding antitrust plaintiff with an inherently
implausible claim was subject to dismissal at summary judgment).
2.

See JOE CECIL & GEORGE CORT. FED. JUDICIAL CTR., REPORT ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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has not resulted in federal judges granting or denying summary
judgment in statistically significant ways than before the trilogy.
Although the courts did experience a brief uptick in summary judgment
dismissals in the immediate aftermath of the trilogy, things soon settled
back to the summary judgment relative equilibrium that existed prior to
the trilogy.
Arguably, the summary judgment trilogy had its greatest impact on
the way in which first year civil procedure professors teach summary
judgment. As the now reigning interpretation of Rule 56,3 Celotex has
become the standard teaching decision on summary judgment.
Conventionally, Celotex is presented as the case in which the Court
attempted two things: (1) to clarify the burdens of production,
persuasion, and proof at summary judgment, and (2) to rectify a
misapprehension of the Court's previous decision in Adickes v. S.H.
Kress & Co.,4 often misunderstood as requiring that a summary
judgment plaintiff prove up the absence of a genuine issue of material
fact-that is, prove up a negative proposition.5
The usual presentation of Celotex, then, focuses on Justice
Rehnquist's attempts to clarify the proper application of Rule 56,6
followed by consideration of Justice Brennan's dissent which attempts

PRACTICE ACROSS DISTRICTS WITH VARIATIONS IN LOCAL RULES 1-2 (2008) (concluding that

there is minimal differentiation in the rate of filing and granting summary judgment motions
across federal district courts); JOE CECIL ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., TRENDS IN SUMMARY

JUDGMENT PRACTICE: 1975-2000, at 23-24 (2007) [hereinafter CECIL ET AL., TRENDS] (finding
that the rate of filing and granting summary judgment motions "generally changed very little after
the trilogy" except in tort cases, which the authors contend is caused by other factors); JOE CECIL
& GEORGE CORT. FED. JUDICIAL CTR., ESTIMATES OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT ACTIVITY IN
FISCAL YEAR 2006. at 1-2 (2007) (analyzing summary judgment activity in 179,969 cases
terminated in the seventy-eight federal district courts that had fully implemented the CM/ECF
reporting system in Fiscal Year 2006. and concluding that summary judgment activities varied
greatly within the circuits, due in part to differences in the caseloads of each district); Joe S. Cecil
et al., A Quarter-Century of Summary Judgment Practice in Six Federal District Courts, 4 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 861, 882 (2007) [hereinafter Cecil et al.. Quarter-Century] (finding that
the percentage of cases containing one or more motions for summary judgment increased from
twelve percent in 1975 to seventeen percent 1986, increased to nineteen percent in 1988 and
remained fairly steady ever since-a finding that "would be unexpected by many legal
commentators").
3. FED. R. Clv. P. 56.
4. Adickes v. S.H. Cress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970), overruled in part by Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986).
5. Id. at 157.
6. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322 27 (noting that the Court of Appeals relied on Adickes in
interpreting Rule 56 to require that the party opposing a motion for summary judgment respond
only after the moving party proved the absence of any genuine issues of material fact, and
explaining why this view is "inconsistent with the standard for summary judgment set forth in
[Rule 56]").
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to reclarify Justice Rehnquist's alleged ingenuous articulation of the
burdens at summary judgment, at least according to Justice Brennan.7
Teaching the combined Rehnquist-Brennan "clarified" Rule 56
standards now requires a visual scorecard through labyrinth prose,
thusly:8

II.

BURDENS OF PRODUCTION AND PERSUASION
ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT

A. Party Movingfor Summary Judgment: Initial Burden of Production
Movant carries burden of
persuasion at trial

Nonmovant carries burden of
persuasion at trial

Must show:

Must show:

(1) Credible evidence to support
negating directed verdict at trial

(1) Affirmative evidence
essential.
(2) Nonmoving party's evidence
is absent or insufficient to
establish essential element of
nonmoving party's claim

B. Party Opposing Summary Judgment: Shifted Burden ofProduction
(Rule 56(e))
Movant carries burden of
persuasion at trial

Nonmovant carries burden of
persuasion at trial

Must show:

Must show:

(1) Evidentiary materials
demonstrating existence of
genuine issue for trial

(1) Sufficient evidence to make
out its existence of genuine issue
for trial claim, or
(2) Affidavit requesting additional
time for discovery (Rule 56(f))

7. Id. at 329-37 (Brennan, J.. dissenting).
8. This chart is reproduced from Linda S. Mullenix, Summary Judgment: Taming the Beast of
Burdens, 10 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 433, 464 (1987).
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C. PartyMovingfor Summary Judgment: Ultimate Burden of
Persuasion
Evaluate:
(1) Entire setting of case; entire record and summary judgment
materials
(2) Whether it is clear that trial is unnecessary
(3) Whether there is any doubt as to existence of genuine issue for
trial (to be resolved against moving party)
Teaching Celotex, then, is not for the faint-hearted civil procedure
professor and one always comes away with the vague impression that
no matter how brilliant the academic presentation, there is hardly any
way in which first-year law students can begin to comprehend how
summary judgment actually works in practice. In short, teaching
summary judgment through Celotex and the trilogy has not proven to be
one of civil procedure's finer moments.
In a similar vein, after many years of reading post-Celotex summary
judgment decisions, one begins to form a somewhat fixed, though
completely unsubstantiated impression, that any number of federal
courts are not faring any better with the Celotex decision. Although
many courts routinely cite Celotex at the outset of their summary
judgment decisions, one often searches in vain for the court's analysis
of all those Celotex-style shifting burdens of production, persuasion,
and proof.9
Even more vexing is the trilogy's second leg: Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby.10 Although the Court makes the arguably valid point that a
claim's underlying evidentiary standard ought to apply with equal force
at summary judgment (e.g., the heightened libel standard in Anderson),
one cannot help but wonder how many other examples-apart from a
libel claim-have come within Anderson's orbit in the past twenty-five
years. More on this later.11
Finally, there is the trilogy's third leg: Matsushita Electric Industrial
Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,12 the landmark case in which the Court
finally gave the green light to summary judgment dismissal of an
antitrust suit based on implausible pleading and proof at summary

9. See id. at 459 66 (discussing inapposite evidentiary standards and differing burdens of
production and persuasion at summary judgment).
10. 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
11. See infra notes 49-90 and accompanying text (providing examples of federal cases
involving Anderson's discussion of heightened evidentiary burdens at summary judgment).
12. 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
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judgment.13
Perhaps the only interesting question concerning
Matsushita, after twenty-five years, is the extent to which this decision
largely has been swallowed by the Court's 2007 additional foray into
antitrust pleading in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly.14 Indeed, what
need do we have of Matsushitawhen we now have Twombly?15
The purpose of this Article is to attempt to substantiate at least two
propositions about the great summary judgment trilogy after twenty-five
years in federal jurisprudence. The first testable proposition centers on
the inquiry concerning the extent and nature of citation to Celotex
among federal judges and the ways in which courts have actually
followed the Celotex burden-shifting analytical framework.
The working presumption guiding this inquiry is that although many,
if not most, federal courts cite Celotex, a substantial number of federal
courts do not actually apply the Court's articulation of the shifting
burdens of production, persuasion, or proof. If this is true, then Celotex
has had an "impact" in name (and citation) only, and not in practical
application. In other words, federal judges may instead be deciding
summary judgment motions the old-fashioned way-according to some
gestalt sense-not unlike what federal judges were doing before
Celotex.
13.

Id. at 596-98.

14. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
15. In Matsushita. an antitrust action brought under section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.
the Supreme Court reversed a Third Circuit decision denying the defendants' summary judgment
motion. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 598. The Third Circuit had held that there was both direct and
circumstantial evidence of an antitrust conspiracy to allow the case to go to trial. Id. at 580. The
Supreme Court disagreed. holding that the direct evidence on which the Third Circuit had relied
had little relevance to the predatory pricing conspiracy, and that the appellate court failed to
consider the absence of a plausible motive to engage in predatory pricing. Id. at 596-97.
Presaging the Court's 2007 decision in Twombly. the Court in Matsushita concluded that when
the claims are implausible and make no economic sense, then plaintiffs must offer more
persuasive evidence to support their claims than would otherwise be necessary. Id.; see also 10
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT. ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE. FEDERAL PRACTICE AND

PROCEDURE § 2732.1 (3d ed. 1998) (discussing Matsushita). Significantly, since 1986, no lower
federal court cases have relied on Matsushita in the antitrust context. See id. § 2732.1 n.24.
The Court's Matsushita decision and its language requiring plausible evidence at the summary
judgment stage, pre-saged the Court's 2007 decision in Twombly. In that case, the Court had to
consider the appropriateness of a threshold Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of an antitrust conspiracy
lawsuit based on alleged insufficient allegations in the pleadings. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 552.
Famously. the Court held that a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal was appropriate because a plaintiffs
offer of conspiracy evidence had to rise above the level of mere possibility, and must present
enough factual matter that, when taken as true, present plausible grounds to infer that a
conspiratorial agreement existed. Id. at 570. Twombly's "plausible pleading" standard is the
direct lineal descendant of Matsushita'splausibility standard at summary judgment, and because
a section 1 Sherman antitrust complaint is now subject to the Twombly plausible pleading
standards on a threshold Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, this would seem to winnow the number
of antitrust complaints that will now survive the Matsushita scrutiny at summary judgment.
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And second, Anderson has not had "legs" in the Hollywood sense:
apart from libel claims, there are not very many other examples where
judges have recognized and applied a differential evidentiary standard
of proof at summary judgment.
Furthermore, if one discounts
Matsushita as a Twombly-impaired ruling, then inexorably one is led to
the conclusion that the summary judgment trilogy, at twenty-five, has
been much ado about very little.

III. A VERY

MODEST EMPIRICAL STUDY OF CELOTEX

The FJC has preempted and occupied the entire field of empirical
study of summary judgment in the post-Celotex era.16 So complete and
thorough are these studies that it is humbling to even attempt to venture
in this field. Nevertheless, the multitude of FJC studies have largely
focused on various bean-counting exercises, plotting the incidence of
summary judgment grants or denials, in several different judicial arenas,
in varying types of cases, over periods of time. 17 The general purpose
of the FJC studies has been to ascertain whether the summary judgment
trilogy has indeed contributed to greater judicial flexing of its summary
disposition authority.' 8
The FJC studies, however, have left unexamined and unanswered a
series of questions that are unrelated to their bottom line tallies of
summary judgment dispositions. Thus, this study modestly focused on
answering the question not of "how many" but of "how." This, then, is
an analysis of how courts have been reading, interpreting, and applying
the Celotex decision, not how many courts have granted or denied
summary judgment motions.
The aim of this research was to determine if federal courts are
applying the burden-shifting framework of motions for summary
judgment the Court announced in Celotex.19 The study centered on
examining three primary questions: In those cases where a court
considered a summary judgment motion, did the court (1) cite Celotex,
(2) discuss the Celotex standards as articulated by the Supreme Court

16. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (listing numerous studies conducted by the
Federal Judicial Center analyzing the topic of summary judgment post-Celotex).
17. See generally CECIL ET AL., TRENDS, supra note 2, at I (stating that this particular study
was comprised of information from "six federal district courts during six time periods over
twenty-five years (1975-2000)").
18. See id. ("[T]he likelihood of a case containing one or more motions for summary
judgment increased before the Supreme Court trilogy, from approximately 12% in 1975 to 17%
in 1986, and has remained fairly steady at approximately 19% since that time.").
19. See supra note 8 and accompanying chart (depicting the burden-shifting framework
adopted by the Court in Celotex).
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(either in Justice Rehnquist or Brennan's decisions), and (3) consciously
apply those Celotex standards to reach its conclusion about granting or
denying summary judgment? In addition, the study further attempted to
examine how courts that did not cite Celotex evaluated summary
judgment motions. Finally, the study focused on a subset of summary
judgment motions in insurance cases, to ascertain the extent to which
the Celotex burden-shifting standards have had an impact on contracttype cases.
TV. METHODOLOGY

As the FJC has repeatedly documented, and as is generally well
known, courts routinely render thousands of summary judgment
motions annually. 2 0 Moreover, courts dispose of a large percentage of
summary judgment motions in unreported and unpublished actions. 2 1
Over a twenty-five year span, then, the sheer volume of summary
judgment activity presents a daunting task for assessing the impact of
Celotex's jurisprudence on the way in which courts actually consider
and decide summary judgment motions.
Instead, for the purpose of obtaining a snapshot of Celotex's impact
on judicial application of summary judgment procedure, this study
analyzed all published and unpublished Circuit Court of Appeals
decisions in 2010, a universe of 222 cases. 22 Appellate decisions were
selected as the basis for study because the LexisNexis and Westlaw
databases indicated in excess of 10,000 reported and unreported district
court summary judgment decisions in 2010 alone, a database too large
for the reading and parsing every district court summary judgment
disposition. 2 3
Similar to the FJC studies, routine high-volume

20. See, e.g., Cecil et al.. Quarter-Century. supra note 2. at 869 (summarizing the number of
cases involving motions for summary judgment this study sampled from six district courts
between 1975 and 2000).
21. See id. (arguing that the "denial of a summary judgment motion may not generate a formal
opinion that meets standards for publication or inclusion in a computerized legal reference
system," and that these unpublished rulings on summary judgment motions often "escape the
notice of scholars who rely on only published opinions").
22. The data was obtained using the Westlaw and LexisNexis databases; cases were located
using the search phrases "Celotex" and "summary judgment." The search excluded cases in
which Celotex was a party or which cited a different case in which Celotex was a party.
23. See Brooke D. Coleman. The Celotex Initial Burden Standard and an Opportunity to
"Revivify" Rule 56, 32 S. ILL. U. L.J. 295, 309 (2008) (analyzing the impact of the Celotex
standards on district court decisions in the Federal District Court for the Northern District of
California). Professor Coleman's findings with regard to the impact of the Celotex standards on
district court summary judgment decisions largely agree with the findings of this study of
appellate summary judgment decisions. Id. at 319.
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categories of cases such as social security actions were excluded from
the study.
Within the universe of appellate decisions, then, summary judgment
decisions were sorted based on three different criteria:
(1) Did the court correctly cite the burden-shifting framework of
Celotex? These cases were categorized as "correctly citing the
burdens."
(2) If the court did cite the burden-shifting framework, then did the
court correctly apply the burden-shifting framework to the
particular facts and parties of the case? These cases were
categorized as "correctly applying the burden."
(3) If the court did not specifically cite or apply Celotex, did the
court's decision contain any discussion of a party presenting
evidence or failing to present evidence to create a genuine issue of
material fact (as opposed to simply stating, on the merits, that a
party's claim failed or did not fail)? These cases were categorized
as "presenting some evidence" without specifically citing or
applying Celotex.
Appendix A to this Article provides further detail describing how the
database cases were categorized according to a court's legal and factual
analysis of the motion. 24
V. RESULTS AND TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS
The analysis of the 2010 database of circuit court summary judgment
decisions seems to support the thesis that courts more widely ignore
than honor the Celotex burden-shifting analytical framework so
elaborately set forth in the Celotex opinions. Furthermore, in the subset
of cases where the appellate courts have cited Celotex, application of the
Supreme Court's carefully crafted articulation of shifting burdens of
production, persuasion, and proof often seems sketchy, incomplete, or
less-than-rigorous, at best.
The threshold inquiry centered on the simple examination of how
many courts minimally cite the Celotex decision as the leading Rule 56
precedent governing summary judgment dispositions. Surprisingly,
analysis of the 2010 database cases as shown in Figure 1 indicates that
in more than half of the reported appellate decisions where courts
reviewed summary judgment decisions- 118 decisions-the appellate
court unexpectedly did not even cite Celotex, now the leading Supreme
Court Rule 56 precedent. 2 5
24. The Excel spreadsheet categorizing all 222 appellate decisions, with quoted exemplary
language from each decision, is on record with the Loyola University Chicago Law Journal.
25. See, e.g., Wilcox v. Homestake Mining Co., 619 F.3d 1165, 1166-74 (10th Cir. 2010)
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As indicated in Figure 1, courts did make some reference to Celotex,
then, in the remaining 104 decisions in the database, even though a
particular court's reference to Celotex might not have been direct
citation of the case, but rather some description capturing at least partial
recognition of Celotex's articulation of burden-shifting requirements. 2 6
As we shall see, evaluating judicial "citation" to Celotex embraces a
somewhat nuanced problem that involves parsing and interpreting a
court's description of the basis for its legal analysis.
FIGURE

1

Does the case cite the summary judgment brden-shifting framework of Celotex?

Thus, courts cited Celotex only in slightly greater than a quarter of
the cases-sixty-two decisions. In the remaining universe of
approximately 15% of cases-thirty-three decisions-courts elliptically
cited Celotex-type standards when referring to the nonmovant's
burden, 27 and in fewer than 5% of the cases-nine decisions-the court
focused on the problem of the movant's burden. 28 Thus, courts made
(failing to cite the Celotex decision entirely in affirming summary judgment in favor of the
movant).
26. See, e.g.. Evans Cabinet Corp. v. Kitchen Int'l. Inc., 593 F.3d 135. 140 (1st Cir. 2010)
(describing the Celotex burden-shifting framework as requiring the moving party to "put the ball
in play," and stating that the nonmoving party must then "come forward with competent evidence
to rebut the assertion of the moving party").
27. See, e.g., Warf v. Bd. of Elections of Green Cnty., Ky., 619 F.3d 553, 558 (6th Cir. 2010)
(describing that the nonmoving party must show "sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of
material fact," but failing to apply this rule to the facts of the case).
28. See, e.g., Baribeau v. City of Minneapolis, 596 F.3d 465. 485 (8th Cir. 2010) (citing the
portion of the Celotex opinion describing the movant's burden and applying only that portion of
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some reference, either fully or partially, to Celotex-style analysis in a
total of 104 database cases.

The study's second inquiry then addressed the extent to which courts
actually applied or attempted to apply the Celotex standards relating to
burden-shifting. Figure 2 illustrates the somewhat surprising results in
the 222 cases forming the database:
FIGURE
Doies the G,-,

2

Wppj1m,Ouridi -,Itli, -!t..~i
,

C~t

As the data in Figure 2 indicates, in the two-thirds of appellate
decisions considering the propriety of a summary judgment motion,
courts failed to apply the Celotex standards in 148 cases. Courts fully
applied the Celotex burden-shifting standards in only 20% of casesforty-four decisions-and partially applied the Celotex burden-shifting
framework in less than 15% of decisions-thirty decisions.

Having determined that in 104 of the database cases courts directly or
elliptically made reference to the Celotex standards, 29 the study further
investigated the ways in which courts in those 104 decisions actually
applied the Celotex burden-shifting framework. Do courts understand

the Celotex burden-shifting test to the facts).
29. See supra note 26 and accompanying text (describing the 104 cases where courts have at
least partially recognized the burden-shifting framework set out in Celotex).
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and embrace the Supreme Court's nuanced articulation of Rule 56
shifting burdens of production, persuasion, and proof? This inquiry
sought to ascertain the extent to which courts completely-or
incompletely-followed the Celotex framework; specifically, whether
the court's analysis focused initially on identifying the party seeking
summary judgment; whether the court identified which party carried the
burden of proof on issues at trial; and whether the court applied those
relative burdens in assessing the offers of proof and burden-shifting on
the summary judgment motion.
Examining courts' legal analyses to evaluate the extent to which
judges actually walked through the Celotex burden-shifting framework
revealed that, among the subset in which courts attempted to apply
Celotex, a fairly small percentage of judges actually deployed the
Celotex standards to full effect. This is illustrated in Figure 3:
FIGURE 3
For cases thatoite the burden shiftg

Do -twl

-d.

framework

of Catotex, does the case appty that ramework?

~

It should be kept in mind that each chart represents an increasingly
narrower subset of the database cases. Thus, the data indicated that
federal judges have varying perceptions and understandings of how to
apply the Celotex analytical framework, once a court chose to venture
beyond mere citation of Celotex as the reigning Rule 56 standard.
As Figure 3 illustrates, in nearly one-third of cases where courts cited
Celotex's burden-shifting language, courts made no attempt to actually
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apply Celotex's burden-shifting framework in 30 decisions out of 104
reported cases. 30 The chart also indicates the interesting ways in which
judges characterized Celotex's burden-shifting language, even though
the court ultimately did not apply the burden-shifting standard.
Thus, in slightly greater than 16% of cases-seventeen decisionsthe court correctly cited the burden-shifting framework entirely but did
not apply it to the facts, 3 1 in another 11% of cases-eleven decisionsthe courts referred to Celotex's description of the non-movant's burden
only without applying it to the facts of the case, 32 and in less than 2% of
cases-two decisions-judges referred to Celotex's characterization of
the movant's burden only without applying it. 33 What this suggests,
perhaps, is that judges have a decidedly mixed appreciation for the
entire Celotex burden-shifting framework, coupled with some
corresponding level of ennui about applying that framework partially,
completely, or at all.
However, the 104 database cases represented in Figure 3 also indicate
that in approximately 71% of decisions where courts cited Celotexseventy-four cases, federal judges made some attempt to apply the
Celotex burden-shifting paradigm.
However, this relatively high
percentage does not indicate how courts applied the burden-shifting
paradigm-that is, whether courts followed through the entire exercise
of identifying whether the movant or nonmovant carried the burden of
production, when and how that burden was shifted, and whether shifting
burdens had an impact on the ultimate summary judgment disposition.
As Figure 3 illustrates, within the universe of cases where judges
actually applied the full burden-shifting analytical framework set forth
at the outset of this Article, 34 they did so in fewer than half (42.3%) of
their decisions. The charts further elucidate the various ways in which
courts citing Celotex actually then apply those standards to the facts

30. See, e.g.. Chaney v. Dreyfus Serv. Corp.. 595 F.3d 219. 228-29 (5th Cir. 2010)
(neglecting to correctly cite the burden-shifting test from Celotex and failing to apply this test to
the facts of the case as a result).
31. See, e.g.. H&R Block E. Enters., Inc. v. Morris, 606 F.3d 1285, 1290 (11th Cir. 2010)
(citing the full burden-shifting framework adopted in Celotex without any application of the test
to the facts of the case).
32. See, e.g., Cole v. Homier Distrib. Co., 599 F.3d 856, 864-65 (8th Cir. 2010) (citing
Celotex only as it applied to the nonmovant's burden, but neglecting to apply Celotex to the facts
of the case).
33. See, e.g., Harris v. New Werner Holding Co., 390 F. App'x 395, 399 400 (5th Cir. 2010)
(describing only the movant's burden contained in the Celotex burden-shifting framework, while
failing to apply this test to the facts).
34. See supra note 8 and accompanying chart (explaining the burden-shifting framework
adopted by the majority in Celotex).
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presented on the summary judgment motion. Hence, in 21.2% of
decisions-twenty-two cases-the courts cited and applied only the
Celotex burden-shifting framework as it pertains to the nonmovant's
burden; 3 5 in 6.7% of cases-seven decisions-courts cited and applied
the Celotex framework with regards to the movant's burden only; 3 6 and
in 1% of cases-one decision-the court cited the full Celotex burdenshifting framework but applied the nonmovant burden only. 3 7
Figure 3 perhaps partially addresses the question: If judges are not
entirely working their way through a complete Celotex analysis, then
what are judges doing after they cite Celotex? In one-fifth of cases,
judges cited to Celotex and determined the summary judgment burden
on the nonmovant only, and in less than 7% of cases, courts cited and
determined the burden on the movant only. This is an interesting
finding, given that the core problem raised by the facts in Celotex
centered on whether the party moving for summary judgmentCelotex-satisfied its initial burden of production to trigger burdenshifting to the nonmoving party.
VI. WHAT, THEN, ARE FEDERAL JUDGES ACTUALLY DOING IN SUMMARY
JUDGMENT CASES?, OR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, I KNow IT WHEN I SEE IT
As the above analysis suggests, federal courts in a surprising number
of cases do not cite Celotex, or if they do, then they do not apply the
Celotex burden-shifting standards (or if they attempt to apply Celotex,
apply it partially or haphazardly). This inexorably leads to the highly
interesting question: How, then, are courts evaluating summary
judgment motions if they are not citing, relying on, or applying the
Celotex standards? What are those federal courts doing instead? Figure
4 offers at least some data to hypothesize an answer to this riddle.
The 2010 decisions indicate that in just over 60% of cases where
courts did not cite Celotex or its burden-shifting framework- 118
cases-courts nonetheless noted that some party either had presented, or
failed to adduce, sufficient evidence upon which the court could dispose

35. See, e.g., Vereecke v. Huron Valley Sch. Dist., 609 F.3d 392. 399-403 (discussing Celotex
only as it applies to the nonmovant's burden to show "sufficient evidence to create a genuine
issue of material fact," and concluding that the facts of the case indicate the nonmoving party has
failed to meet his requirement under Celotex).
36. See, e.g.. Parkey v. Sample, 623 F.3d 1163. 1165 (7th Cir. 2010) (stating that a moving
party's motion for summary judgment "may succeed by showing an absence of evidence to
support the non-moving party's claims," and applying only this test to the facts of the case).
37. See, e.g., Amazing Spaces. Inc. v. Metro Mini Storage. 608 F.3d 225, 234-50 (5th Cir.
2010) (citing the entire Celotex burden-shifting framework, but applying only the nonmovant's
burden to the facts of the case).
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of the summary judgment motion. Because the courts decided the
summary judgment motion without the aid of articulated Celotex
analysis, this universe of cases perhaps may be characterized as
representing the "gestalt" or "seat of the pants" school of judicial
evaluation of whether summary judgment is appropriate, unmoored
from the complicated Celotex burden-shifting exercise. 38
Perhaps the most perplexing cohort of decisions-forty-six appellate
decisions where Celotex is not cited or relied upon-embraced
decisions where the court disposed of the summary judgment motion,
but made no mention at all whether the parties presented evidence
sufficient to grant or deny the summary judgment motion. Because
courts in these cases nevertheless decided the motion, one may only
observe that there is an entire universe of summary judgment
dispositions where it is difficult to ascertain both the factual or legal
basis on which the court has decided the motion, twenty-five years after
Celotex and the Supreme Court trilogy.
FIGURE
For Cases tt

4

neither the nor apply the burdn shdting tramework of Celte, d

note that a party has prodtc~d or fefod to produVe evidenice that woud affect a motion for
summary jud4gmeff~

VII. CELOTEXAND THE SUBSET OF CONTRACT CASES
The research also examined the sub-universe of cases involving
summary judgment motions in insurance contract cases, comprising
twenty-four decisions.
Historically, pre-Celotex, the conventional
38. In fairness, it also could mean that the judge or judges in these cases had an internalized
version of Celotex in their consciousness, which they applied to the facts but chose not to
memorialize verbatim in the summary judgment opinion.

Much Ado About Very Little

2012]

575

wisdom was that contract cases embraced a type of substantive case
most suitable for easy summary disposition, because courts could
readily determine the motion based on the four corners of the
contractual agreement and without much further ado. 39 The study
examined whether the Celotex burden-shifting framework has made
significant inroads on judicial evaluation of summary judgment motions
in insurance contract cases, illustrated in Figure 5:
FIGURE
For insurance cases, does the ca

5
cite and/or apply Ceoltex?

The 2010 database cases represented in Figure 5 indicate that in twothirds of summary judgment motions based on insurance contract
claims, courts failed to cite or apply the Celotex decision (representing
sixteen out of twenty-four cases).40 And in the one-third of cases where
courts cited Celotex-similar to the larger universe of all summary
judgment decisions-the insurance contract cases presented a mixed
bag of Celotex deployment.
Thus, 4% of the insurance contract cases courts fully cited Celotex,
but then simply did not apply it.41 In this vein, courts cited and fully

39. See generally WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 15, §2730.1 (describing summary
cases involving insurance contracts).
40. See, e.g., Travelers Lloyds Ins. Co. v. Pac. Emp'rs Ins. Co., 602 F.3d 677, 677-87 (5th
Cir. 2010) (failing to cite Celotex entirely, and including no discussion of burden-shifting in
reviewing a motion for summary judgment that was granted in an insurance case).
41. See, e.g., Versai Mgmt. Corp. v. Clarendon Am. Ins. Co., 597 F.3d 729, 735-41 (5th Cir.
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applied Celotex in only 13% of the insurance contract cases-three
decisions 42-and in scattered smaller percentages cited the relative
shifting burdens on the movant and nonmovant, but then failed to apply
those burdens to the facts presented in the motion. 43
It would not be entirely unfounded to suggest that Celotex decision
seems to be somewhat largely ignored in the subset of summary
judgment motions grounded in underlying insurance contract claims.
Perhaps the simplest explanation for this subset of cases is that courts
are behaving in nearly the same way they did pre-Celotex: courts
continue to recognize that contract cases are relatively easy cases for
summary judgment determination, and do not need an elaborate burdenshifting apparatus to permit a court to make a decision about whether to
grant or deny the motion.
VITT.

SPECIAL ISSUES: SUMMARY JUDGMENT BURDENS THAT THE

CELOTEX

COURT DID NOT CONTEMPLATE

As is undoubtedly true in the wake of many landmark Supreme Court
decisions, lower federal courts often identify new issues not
contemplated by the Court in issuing definitive clarifications to guide
the lower courts. This apparently has occurred in the aftermath of the
Court's authoritative clarification of Rule 56 burdens in Celotex, as
some federal courts grapple with summary judgment motions and
consequently further elaborate doctrine concerning relative burdens on
summary judgment seekers.
An interesting post-Celotex development, then, has been the
emergence of competing jurisprudence concerning who carries what
duty to point to, or to present, or call to the court's attention the
presence of evidence in the record to support or oppose a summary
judgment motion. This might be characterized as a "no sifting by the
court" rule (or an anti-lazy advocate penalty). At least one circuit court
has characterized this additional burden as a fair gloss on Celotex.44
2010) (citing the full burden-shifting framework established in Celotex, but neglecting to apply
any facet of this framework in reviewing the motion for summary judgment in this insurance
case).
42. See, e.g., Bayle v. Allstate Ins. Co., 615 F.3d 350, 355-63 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing the
Celotex burden-shifting framework in its entirety and applying the full framework to the specific
facts of this insurance case).
43. See, e.g.. Beckley Mech.. Inc. v. Erie Ins. Prop. & Cas. Co., 374 F. App'x 381. 383 (4th
Cir. 2010) (citing the Celotex burden-shifting framework only as it pertains to the nonmoving
party, while failing to apply any part of the Celotex framework to the facts of the case).
44. See Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Willoughby, 863 F.2d 1029, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1988):
We find the Fifth Circuit's discussion of this issue in Nissho-1wai Am. Corp. v. Kline.
845 F.2d 1300, 1307 (5th Cir. 1988), to be persuasive. After rejecting appellants
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As astonishing as this sounds, some circuit courts appear to have
suggested that a court does not have to grant or deny summary
judgment, even if there is evidence in the record to support or oppose
the motion, if the court has to "sift through the record" to make a
summary judgment finding. Instead, these courts suggest that, even if
evidence exists in the record before the court, a party has to specifically
point to or present that evidence in order to satisfy the party's burden at
summary judgment. 45
In contrast, at least one federal circuit has suggested mitigation of this
harsh approach through a literal construction of Rule 56 language,
which mandates evaluation of summary judgment motions based on
"the record as a whole." 4 6 Construing this language, the Tenth Circuit
has indicated that courts have some duty to sift through the record, and
if a court could find evidence to support a motion for summary
judgment, then a court should grant it, even if the moving party doesn't
specificallypoint out the evidence to the court. 4 7

argument that the district court erred in failing to consider an unsworn affidavit in
opposition to a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the Kline court ruled
that the trial court had no duty to consider certain deposition testimony in the record
that appellantfailed to bring to the court's attention. Relying on Celotex. the court
held that appellant's failure to designate facts evidenced in the deposition that would
support her case was fatal. In reaching this decision, the court rejected the incorrect
assumption that the entire record in the case must be searched and found bereft of a
genuine issue of material fact before summary judgment may be properly entered. We
similarly reject appellant's claim that the district court should have examined the entire
record when considering Mr. Willoughby's summary judgment motion. Appellant's
failure to designate and reference triablefacts was, in light of the language of Rule
56(c) andgoverningprecedent,fatal to its opposition.
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
45. See Parsons v. FedEx Corp., 360 F. App'x 642, 646 (6th Cir. 2010):
A district court need only consider the evidence presented to it when considering a
motion for summary judgment, regardless of whether other potentially relevant
evidence exists somewhere in the record. A district court has no duty to shift through
the record in search of evidence to support a party's opposition to summary judgment.
Thus, rule 56 allocates that duty to the opponent of the motion, who is requiredto point
out the evidence, albeit evidence that is already in the record, that creates an issue of
fact.
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
46. See Odom v. Potter, 379 F. App'x 740. 743-44 (10th Cir. 2010):
Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Although the court may not
make credibility determinations or weigh evidence at the summary judgment stage,
where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the
nonmoving party. there is no genuine issue for trial.
Id. (internal citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
47. Id.
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Finally, some federal courts that have acknowledged the Celotex
burden-shifting framework have further suggested that this analytical
framework may be relaxed in certain causes of action. For example, the
Celotex burden-shifting framework has been relaxed in instances where
prison officials have asserted claims for qualified immunity from suit. 48

IX.

THE NON-IMPACT OF ANDERSON V'.LIBERTY

LOBBY, INC.

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., the second decision of the Court's
summary judgment trilogy, established the principle that a court
evaluating a summary judgment motion must take into account the
substantive evidentiary burden that the court will apply at trial.49
Anderson involved a suit for libel brought by Liberty Lobby, Inc.5 0 The
defendants, including journalist Jack Anderson, moved for summary
judgment and the Supreme Court ruled that because the party opposing
the summary judgment would have to prove its libel claim by clear and
convincing evidence at trial, the district court had to evaluate the
summary judgment motion in light of that higher evidentiary standard. 5 1
In other words, the usual civil trial standard of "preponderance of the
evidence" did not apply to the court's summary judgment assessment. 52
The Court's Anderson decision raised some questions about the
appropriateness of requiring a higher, differential evidentiary standard

48. See Gates v. Tex. Dep't of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 537 F.3d 404, 419 (5th Cir.
2008):
In the summary judgment context, a government official need only plead qualified
immunity, which then shifts the burden to the plaintiff. The plaintiff must rebut the
defense by establishing that the official's allegedly wrongful conduct violated clearly
established law and that genuine issues of material fact exist regarding the
reasonableness of the official's conduct.
Id. (internal citations omitted); see also Thayer v. Adams, 364 F. App'x 883, 889 (5th Cir. 2010):
We approach summary judgment differently when qualified immunity is at issue. In
this context, the moving party is not required to meet its summary judgment burden for
a claim of immunity. Rather, the movant need only plead her good-faith entitlement to
qualified immunity, whereupon the burden shifts to the plaintiff to rebut it.
Id. (internal citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
49. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc.. 477 U.S. 242. 252 (1986).
50. Id. at 244.
51. Id. at 252 ("[W]e are convinced that the inquiry involved in a ruling on a motion for
summary judgment or for a directed verdict necessarily implicates the substantive evidentiary
standard of proof that would apply at the trial on the merits.").
52. See WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE. supra note 15, § 2727 (discussing how the clear and
convincing standard, and not the preponderance of the evidence standard, applied in Anderson).
In addition, in order to rebut a properly supported motion filed by a moving party, the opposing
party needs to indicate how the nonmovant will support the argument that fact issues remain for
trial, and Rule 56(e) requires the opposing party to set forth facts that would be admissible at trial.

Id.
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for certain substantive cases, in light of the purported trans-substantive
nature of the federal rules. In addition, as reflected in Justice Brennan's
dissent in Anderson, the Court's majority decision raised at least some
concern that Anderson's holdings would lead to "trial by affidavit,"
imposing onerous evidentiary burdens at the pretrial summary judgment
stage of proceedings. 5 3
Whatever concerns or doomsday predictions the Anderson decision
may have inspired, the core Anderson holding on evidentiary burdens
has had a negligible effect on the thousands of summary judgment
decisions courts have rendered in the past twenty-five years. Indeed,
examining the entire corpus of federal district court and appellate
decisions over a twenty-four year span, only three reported district court
decisions cite and rely on the Anderson holdings. This may be partially
explained by the fact that there are few claims with deferential
evidentiary standards, so Anderson's impact may be cabined by this
reality. However, perhaps the only noteworthy observation about the
Anderson decision is to suggest that it seems to have had scant impact
on the overwhelming majority of summary judgment dispositions.
Furthermore, the three subsequent Anderson cases are entirely
unremarkable. For the record, the three instances in which federal
district courts have invoked and applied Anderson involved underlying
claims for lease reformation based on New York state law, 5 4 an ERISA
claim, 5 5 and a patent infringement action. 56 All three courts, in
considering the summary judgment motions, indicated that a court must
view the evidence submitted on the motion through the prism of the
underlying substantive evidentiary burden. In two of the three cases the
courts denied the summary judgment for failure of the moving parties to
satisfy the differential evidentiary burden; 5 7 in one instance a summary
judgment movant prevailed based on the application of the higher

53. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 266-67 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that the summary
judgment procedure adopted by the majority could "transform what is meant to provide an
expedited 'summary' procedure into a full-blown paper trial on the merits").
54. Khezrie v. Greenberg, No. 98-CV-3638(ERK). 2001 WL 1922664 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 11.
2001).
55. Wasson v. Media Gen., Inc., 446 F. Supp. 2d 579, 581 (E.D. Va. 2006).
56. Mass. Inst. of Tech. v. Harman Int'l Indus. Inc.. 584 F. Supp. 2d 297. 300 (D. Mass.
2008).
57. See Wasson, 446 F. Supp. 2d at 602 (denying the movant's motion for summary judgment
because the evidence supporting the movant's motion did not meet the heightened evidentiary
burden under ERISA); see also Mass. Inst. of Tech.. 584 F. Supp. 2d at 316 (holding that the
movant's motion for sunmary judgment should be denied, as the movant had "failed to adduce
sufficient evidence as measured by the clear and convincing standard").
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evidentiary standard and the nonmovant's failure to satisfy that higher
evidentiary standard. 5 8
In the New York lease case, Khezrie v. Greenberg, Khezrie entered
into a commercial lease agreement with Greenberg. 59
Khezrie
subsequently assigned the lease to a corporation, which ceased payment
with a remaining four-year term. 60 Greenberg then sued Khezrie for
payment in New York state court. 6 1 While this case was pending,
Khezrie sued Greenberg in federal court, seeking reformation of the
lease agreement based on theories of mutual mistake, or unilateral
mistake by fraud. 62 Khezrie (the plaintiff) contended that when he
assigned the lease, Greenberg (the defendant) orally agreed that Khezrie
was relieved of any further obligations under the lease. 63 Greenberg
sought summary judgment on Khezrie's reformation claim. 64
The court granted the defendant's motions for summary judgment on
Khezrie's reformation claim and on his counterclaim and denied the
plaintiffs motion for summary judgment related to the defendant's
counterclaim. 65 The court held that under New York law a party must
show by "clear and convincing evidence" that a lease should be
reformed because of mutual mistake or unilateral mistake or fraud. 6 6
Thus, state law imposed the same higher standard of proof for lease
reformation claims as for libel claims in Anderson.67
In considering the defendant's motion for summary judgment, the
court, citing Anderson, stated that it must view the evidence presented
through the prism of the substantive evidentiary burden, with the burden
being by "clear and convincing evidence" in this case. 68 Since the
plaintiff presented only bald and self-serving allegations of an oral
agreement at odds with a written agreement, summary judgment was
appropriate on the reformation claim. 69

58. See Khezrie, 2001 WL 1922664. at *6 (stating that granting the movant's motion for
summary judgment is appropriate where the nonmovant fails to meet "the substantive evidentiary
standard that would apply at trial").
59. Id at *1.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at *3.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at *9.
66. Id. at *6.
67. Id.
68. Id. (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)).
69. Id. at *7.
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In the ERISA case, Wasson v. Media General, Inc., the plaintiff
Wasson was injured on her job working for Media General, Inc.70 She
applied for long-term disability benefits with the newspaper's benefits
plan, which were denied. 7 1 She then sued in federal court alleging that
the benefits plan violated ERISA and the plan abused its discretion in
denying her claim. 7 2 The parties filed cross-motions for summary
judgment on the issue of whether the plaintiff was entitled to long-term
disability benefits. 73
The substantive law underlying an ERISA claim indicates that an
ERISA plan administrator's decision will not be disturbed if it is
supported by "substantial evidence"-which may be somewhat less
than a preponderance of the evidence-and if the decision was the result
of a deliberate, reasoned process. 7 4 Again, citing to Anderson, the court
indicated that in evaluating a summary judgment motion, the court must
view the evidence through the lens of substantive evidentiary
standards. 7 5 The court asked whether no reasonable juror could find
that the defendant's benefit plan made its decision supported by
"substantial evidence" and was the result of a reasoned, deliberate
process. 7 6
The court denied both cross-summary judgment motions and
remanded the case to administrative proceedings. 7 7 The defendant's
motion was denied because the administrator's decision to deny benefits
was not supported by substantial evidence and the result of a deliberate,
reasoned process. 7 8 Somewhat illogically, the court further suggested
that in these circumstances, the plaintiffs summary judgment motion
also was denied because no analysis was needed when denying both
motions if the court already denied one of them. 7 9
70. Wasson v. Media Gen., Inc., 446 F. Supp. 2d 579, 582 (E.D. Va. 2006).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 584.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 590.
75. Id. at 589 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 254 (1986) ("[T]he
Supreme Court is clear that 'the judge must view the evidence presented through the prism of the
substantive evidentiary burden."')).
76. Id. at 589-90.
77. Id. at 602-03.
78. Id. at 602.
79. Id. at 603. The court further suggested that even if the Appeals Board decision was based
on substantial evidence and the result of a deliberate and reasoned process. it is possible that the
plaintiff might not be entitled to benefits. Id. At any rate, in remanding the case to administrative
proceedings. the court clearly was signaling its distaste for having to resolve the matter. See id.
("[I]t is preferable that the Appeals Board be required to do its job correctly, to act in accord with
this opinion and Wasson, and then reasonably explain its reasons so that meaningful judicial
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The final case citing and applying Anderson, Massachusetts Institute
of Technology v. Harman International Industries, Inc., 80 involved a
patent infringement claim by MIT against Harman Industries.8 1
Harman moved for summary judgment claiming that the patent was
invalid under two patent law doctrines, resulting in no infringement by
Harman. 82 MIT filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, claiming
the patent was valid. 83
The Patent Act holds that patents are presumptively valid and places
the burden on the party challenging a patent's validity to prove by clear
and convincing evidence that the patent is invalid. 84 Hence, this MIT
patent action shared the same enhanced evidentiary standard as the
Anderson and Khezrie litigations.8 5 Applying the applicable patent
doctrine8 6 and the Anderson heightened evidentiary standard,8 7 the
court denied the summary judgment cross-motions.8 8 The court held
that the defendant had not shown by clear and convincing evidence that
no reasonable juror could fail to find the patent invalid under the public
use doctrine. 89 Moreover, the plaintiff had not shown by clear and
convincing evidence that no reasonable juror could find the patent
invalid under public use doctrine. 9 0

review of the substantive decision can be had").
80. Mass. Inst. of Tech. v. Harman Int'l Indus., Inc., 584 F. Supp. 2d 297 (D. Mass. 2008).
81. Id. at 300.
82. Id.
83. Id.

84. Id. at 307 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1994)).
85. See supra notes 51 and 68 and accompanying text (discussing the heightened evidentiary
burden of "clear and convincing evidence" involved in Anderson and Khezrie, respectively).
86. The alleged patent invalidity claim involved the so-called "public use" patent doctrine.
See Mass. Inst. of Tech., 584 F. Supp. 2d at 309 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994) ("A patent
for a particular invention will be held invalid if the 'invention was .. . in public use .. . in this
country, more than one year prior to the date of the application for patent in the United States."')).
Using the five-factor test for determining the validity of a patent, the court found that while some
factors favored the validity of the patent, other factors showed that the patent was invalid. See id.

at 309-14 (analyzing the five factors to be considered under the "public-use" doctrine and
concluding that Harmon had not established, by clear and convincing evidence, the invalidity of
the patent in question). Because there was not clear and convincing evidence that the patent was
invalid, the court refused to grant the summary judgment motion. Id. at 314.
87. See supra note 51 and accompanying text (discussing Anderson's holding that courts must
evaluate summary judgment motions in light of the evidentiary standard that would otherwise be
applicable at trial).
88. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 584 F. Supp. 2d at 314.
8 9. Id.
90. Id. The MIT case also embodies a fairly admirable understanding and application of the
shifting burdens of Celotex. In another summary judgment motion-declaring a patent invalid
under the printed publication doctrine-the judge granted the plaintiffs motion for summary
judgment. Id. at 316. The defendant pointed out that the plaintiff had produced no evidence to
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X. CONCLUSIONS AND POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS
It is always dangerous to assert sweeping-or less-than-sweepingjurisprudential conclusions based on small empirical databases,
especially when the purported database is complicated by elements of
subjective interpretation of judicial decisions, as is the case with the
database in this study. In addition, it is more than a fair complaint that
evaluating appellate summary judgment decisions in order to ascertain
how such motions are decided, provides either an inapt or inaccurate
reflection of how in-the-trenches district court judges actually consider
and dispose of such motions. Thus, because district court dispositions
of summary judgment motions were not the basis for this analysis, it is
possible that district court judges may be carefully parsing the Celotex
burden-shifting paradigm, and carefully walking through that detailed,
analytical framework.
Nonetheless, cabined with all these varied and numerous limitations,
the 2010 appellate summary judgment decisions reflect something about
the culture of summary judgment adjudication in federal courts, twentyfour years distant from the Court's announcement of its famous trilogy.
And, it is not too far-fetched to suggest that at least some district court
judges take their cues on summary judgment standards from the
appellate courts overseeing their districts.
This study set out to answer a few relatively simple questions: Are
federal courts doing anything more than citing Celotex as the leading
Rule 56 precedent, and if so, are they indeed following the analytical
burden-shifting framework so carefully and elaborately set out by both
Justices Rehnquist and Brennan? A subtextual inquiry was: Do federal
judges understand Celotex any more than our largely confused and
confounded first year law students? In addition, this study also
researched the extent to which the trilogy's second leg, Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., has resulted in numerous trial-by-affidavit
nightmares suggested by Justice Brennan in his dissent. 9 1
The results of this study seem to suggest that in a surprising number
of summary judgment cases, federal courts do not even cite Celotex.92
support its motion, but the court noted that since the plaintiff did not carry the burden at trial of
proving the patent's validity, the plaintiff did not need to introduce affirmative evidence to
support its motion. Id. at 315-16.
91. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.. 477 U.S. 242, 266-67 (1986) (Brennan. J..
dissenting) (describing Justice Brennan's concerns with the cumbersome burden-shifting
framework); see also supra note 53 and accompanying text (discussing the potential for summary
judgment motions to become small-scale trials on the merits of the underlying case after Celotex
and Liberty Lobby).
92. See supra note 25 and accompanying text (concluding that over 50% of the cases involved
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If this were not shocking enough, in the remaining universe of decisions
where courts do cite Celotex, some federal judges do not seem to
acknowledge, understand, or apply the elaborate Celotex conceptual
framework.9 3 The data also seems to suggest that in at least as many
cases, federal judges-as they did pre-Celotex-continue to decide
summary judgment motions on a kind-of gestalt "tennis match" mode of
analysis.
The various FJC studies of post-trilogy summary judgment practice
have demonstrated that the disposition rates (that is, favorable grants of
summary judgment motions) have not increased in statistically
significant ways in the aftermath of the trilogy. 94 Along with the FJC
studies, this very modest study further suggests that the trilogy's central
Celotex decision likewise has had small impact on the ways in which
judges analyze and decide summary judgment motions. In addition,
Anderson's core evidentiary holding has been replicated in exactly three
other somewhat anomalous contexts in the past twenty-five years,
clearly averting any substantial judicial crisis. 95
Surveying these realities, it is difficult not to conclude that the
Court's summary judgment trilogy, along with its attendant hype, has
been much ado about very little. Against this backdrop, practitioners
who must file summary judgment motions may take some comfort in
realizing that in most instances in federal court, at least, the lawyers
need not overly fret over shifting burdens of production, persuasion, and
proof, so long as the attorneys proffer something in the record for a
judge to consider (except in those outlying federal courts that have
chosen to dun attorneys who do not point to the specific evidence). 9 6
And while some erudite judges on the federal bench may justifiably take
pride in wending their way through a recitation and application of the
in this analysis unexpectedly failed to cite Celotex at all). In addition, see Figure I for a graphical
representation of the results of this empirical analysis of cases involving motions for summary
judgment.
93. See supra notes 26-43 and accompanying text (describing the various ways in which
federal courts have cited and applied Celotex's burden-shifting framework). Additionally, see
Figures 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 for a detailed breakdown of how federal courts have cited and applied the
burden-shifting framework adopted by the Supreme Court in Celotex.
94. See Cecil et al., Quarter-Century,supra note 2, at 891 (describing the statistical analysis
conducted in this study and concluding that the study "reveals no meaningful change in motion
rates in the termination years immediately following the summary judgment trilogy in 1986").
95. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text (introducing the three post-Anderson
federal cases that substantially mirrored the issue of heightened evidentiary standards central to
the holding in Anderson).
96. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text (discussing the post-Celotex development
whereby certain federal circuit courts require a party to specifically point to or present evidence to
satisfy a party's burden at summary judgment).
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Celotex standards, judges also may take comfort in knowing that they
largely will not be dunned by their appellate courts for failure to recite
or properly apply Celotex.
One would ordinarily suggest that summary judgment is not a field
ripe for irony, but Justice Sandra Day O'Connor-a member of the
Celotex majority opinion-has indeed dished up one delightful example
of post-Celotex irony. Pursuant to federal statute, in 2010 the Seventh
Circuit designated retired Justice O'Connor to sit on its appellate
bench,9 7 where she had the opportunity to rule on a summary judgment
appeal.98

In considering the lower court's summary judgment disposition, not
only did Justice O'Connor neglect to apply the burden-shifting
standards of Celotex, but she also failed to cite the appropriate Celotex
standard. 99 Instead, her opinion simply notes that: "Summary judgment
is appropriate 'if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials
on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the movant is entitled to summary judgment as a
matter of law,"' 10 0 which is a good regurgitation of Rule 56 (and the
beginning of a solid "B" exam answer). Justice O'Connor's decision
similarly failed to discuss anything about the burdens of the plaintiff or
defendant, or whether they presented or failed to present evidence for a
motion for summary judgment. 0 '
It is perhaps a tad egocentric to conclude this survey with a reflection
of the implications of this study for first-year civil procedure professors,
but the law school teaching of Rule 56 provided the initial inspiration
for this enterprise. As indicated in the Introduction, the Court's trilogy
reshaped the first-year teaching of Rule 56 summary judgment,
requiring civil procedure professors to engage students in complicated
explications of shifting burdens of production, persuasion, and proof

97. See 28 U.S.C. § 294(a) (2006) ("Any retired Chief Justice of the United States or
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court may be designated and assigned by the Chief Justice of
the United States to perform such judicial duties in any circuit, including those of a circuit justice,
as he is willing to undertake.").
98. Spivey v. Adaptive Mktg. LLC, 622 F.3d 816 (7th Cir. 2010).
99. See id. at 822 (asserting when summary judgment is appropriate but not mentioning the
burden shifting standards of Celotex).
100. Id. (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c)).
101. See id. (quoting Rule 56 but failing to discuss the burdens and evidentiary standards
crucial to Celotex). In commenting on Justice O'Connor's decision, my research assistant
appended the following note: "I mention it because I think it makes a good case to single out as
an example of federal courts not applying the burden shifting framework of Celotex. to say. 'Hey.
if members of the majority who wrote Celotex are getting it wrong today, should we be surprised
if current federal judges get it wrong as well?"'
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(and, to run through this mind-expanding exercise largely in absence of
mastery of most substantive law).
Thus, while there is a great deal to be said in favor of raw intellectual
challenge, game-playing, and puzzle-solving, one nonetheless wonders
at the utility of requiring students to master a complicated analytical
framework that courts themselves more often than not do not apply,
including one Supreme Court Justice who was at least an endorser of
that challenging framework.

XI.

APPENDIX

A:

SOME FURTHER NOTES ON METHODOLOGY

Categorization of the 2010 appellate summary judgment decisions
required exercise of considerable subjective, discretionary judgment in
accurately characterizing a court's analysis of the motion, in light of the
Court's Celotex decision.
This appendix provides additional
explanation and illustrative examples of how summary judgment
decisions were parsed and categorized for counting purposes.
A. The Threshold Question. Do CourtsAccurately Recite the Celotex
Burden-ShiftingFramework?
The threshold question in this study examined whether a court's
decision accurately recited the burden-shifting framework of Celotex.
There were four possible answers to this question: (1) Yes, the court
correctly cited or described the burden-shifting framework of Celotex;
(2) No, the court did not correctly recite or describe the burden-shifting
framework of Celotex; (3) The court cited the movant's burden only;
and (4) The court cited the nonmovant's burden only. The latter two
possible responses represent a kind of partial-credit Celotex analysis.
Examples of court decisions reflecting each of these possible
responses is illustrated by the following excerpts from summary
judgment decisions in the 2010 database:
(1)

YES, THE COURT CORRECTLY DESCRIBED THE BURDEN-SHIFTING
FRAMEWORK OF CELOTEX:

Example:

102.

"The moving party bears the initial burden of
showing there is no genuine issue of material
fact. Once the moving party has met its burden,
the burden shifts to the non-moving party to
'designate specific facts0 2 showing there is a
genuine issue for trial."'l

H&R Block E. Enters., Inc. v. Morris, 606 F.3d 1285, 1290 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting
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No, THE COURT DID NOT CORRECTLY CITE OR DESCRIBE THE
BURDEN-SHIFTING FRAMEWORK OF CELOTEX:

Example (a):

The decision makes no mention of the burdenshifting framework of Celotex, but simply
recites the language of Rule 56:
"Summary judgment is appropriate if there
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law." 103

Example (b):

The decision mentions a burden for the
movant, but only in the sense of broadly
quoting the language of Rule 56:
"Under this standard, the movant must
demonstrate that 'there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and that [it] is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law." 104
"[T]he movant has the burden of showing
this court that summary judgment is
appropriate[.]"' 05
"The moving party bears the burden of
establishing a lack of genuine issue of
fact."' 106

(3)

PARTIAL REFERENCE TO CELOTEX CONCEPTS, WITHOUT CITATION

TO CELOTEX: THE COURT CITES TO THE MOVANT'S BURDEN ONLY,
OR STATES THAT THE MOVANT HAS TO PRODUCE EVIDENCE OR TO
MERELY
SHOW THAT
THE NONMOVANT'S
CLAIMS
ARE
INSUFFICIENT

Example:

"Though we construe all facts and make all
reasonable inferences in the nonmoving party's
favor, . . . the moving party may succeed by

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986)) (internal citations omitted).
103. R & J Enters. v. Gen. Cas. Co. of Wis.. 627 F.3d 723. 726 (8th Cir. 2010) (citing FED. R.
Civ. P. 56(a)).
104. Anderson v. Wachovia Mortg. Corp., 621 F.3d 261, 267 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting FED. R.
Civ. P. 56(c)(2)).
105. Irons v. Aircraft Serv. Int'l.. Inc., 392 F. App'x. 305, 311 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing Celotex.
477 U.S. at 323).
106. Brunsting v. Lutsen Mountains Corp., 601 F.3d 813, 820 (8th Cir. 2010) (citing Celotex,
477 U.S. at 323).
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showing an absence of evidence to support the
non-moving party's claims." 10 7

(4)

PARTIAL REFERENCE TO CELOTEX CONCEPTS, WITHOUT CITATION
TO CELOTEX: THE COURT CITES TO THE NONMOVANT'S BURDEN
ONLY, INDICATING THAT THE NONMOVANT HAS TO PRODUCE
ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE (E.G., MAKE A SHOWING SUFFICIENT TO
ESTABLISH THE EXISTENCE OF AN ELEMENT ESSENTIAL TO THAT
PARTY'S CASE, AND ON WHICH THAT PARTY WILL BEAR THE
BURDEN OF PROOF AT TRIAL)

Example:

"[W]here the non-moving party fails to
establish 'the existence of an element essential
to that party's case, and on which that party
will bear the burden of proof at trial,' no
genuine issue of material fact can exist."10 8

B. Has the Court Correctly Applied the Celotex Burden-Shifting
Framework to the Facts in the Motion?
The second question examined in the decisions examined those cases
in which the court correctly identified and described the Celotex
burden-shifting framework, and further asked whether the court
correctly applied that framework to the facts presented in the summary
judgment motion. Court decisions were categorized as either correctly
or not correctly applying the Celotex framework.
(1)

YES, THE COURT CORRECTLY APPLIED THE CELOTEX BURDENSHIFTING FRAMEWORK TO THE FACTS
Example (a):

The court describes the burden meeting by

both parties:
"[S]ummary judgment was appropriate
because the government established by
a preponderance of the evidence that
the money was subject to forfeiture as
drug proceeds.

. .

. Okwuosa did not

come forward with any evidence to
refute the government's declarations . .
. . In opposing the government's

107. Parkey v. Sample, 623 F.3d 1163, 1165 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Celotex. 477 U.S. at 325)
(internal citations omitted).
108. Apache Corp. v. W & T Offshore, Inc., 626 F.3d 789, 793 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting
Nichols v. Enterasys Networks, Inc., 495 F.3d 185, 188 (5th Cir. 2007)).
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motion, Okwuosa failed to
burden of going beyond the
and presenting competent
designating 'specific facts
that there is a genuine
trial."' 10 9
Example (b):

carry his
pleadings
evidence
showing
issue for

The rule describes burden-shifting with
regard to presenting evidence, but in the
application of the rule, one party does or
does not show evidence:
Upon careful review of the record, we
agree with the District Court that
summary judgment for defendants was
appropriate. Jackson failed to provide
any evidence to support the elements
of his claims. 1 10

(2)

No,

THE

COURT

DID NOT

CORRECTLY

APPLY

THE

CELOTEX

ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK TO THE FACTS

Example (a):

The decision does not describe that either
party meets the burden:
"Section 508 requires school board
approval for any services valued above
$100 or 'any subsequent modifications
of a contract that would increase the
school district's indebtedness under
[the] contract.' It is undisputed that the
School Reform Commission did not
authorize the $830,071.68 claimed by
Wayne Moving. Therefore, Wayne
Moving's claim of unjust enrichment
is barred by Section 508." 11

109. United States v. $183,791.00 in U.S. Currency, 391 F. App'x 791, 794-95 (11th Cir.
2010) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24).
110. Jackson v. Beard, 365 F. App'x 332. 333 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Celotex. 477 U.S. at 323).
11l. Wayne Moving & Storage of N.J.. Inc. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 625 F.3d 148. 155 (3d Cir.
2010) (citing Hazleton Area Sch. Dist. v. Krasnoff, 672 A.2d 858. 862 (Pa. Conunw. Ct. 1996)
(internal citation omitted).
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Simply states no genuine issue as to
material fact exists, or makes decision "on
the basis of all the evidence" (or similar
language):
"Considering these facts together, and
drawing all reasonable inferences from
them in favor of the plaintiffs, we are
convinced that the constitutional right
at issue was clearly established as of
the time of the relevant conduct, such
that a reasonable supervisory official
would have known that his actions
were unlawful." 1 2

Example (c):

Discussing substantive burden-shifting,
rather than summary judgment burden
shifting:
"Because Boyland produced no other
evidence to show that a causal
connection existed between his 2004
charge and his termination, he has
failed to meet his burden of
establishing a prima facie case of
retaliation. Accordingly, we affirm the
district court's grant of summary
judgment on Boyland's claim that he
was unlawfully fired in retaliation for
his 2004 charge." 1 13

C. Apart From Celotex Standards, Does the Court Cite to Presentation
ofAny Evidence in Support or Opposition to the Summary Judgment
Motion?
The study also examined whether the decision discussed or
mentioned a party "presenting evidence" to support its motion for
summary judgment. These cases suggest that even if the court does not
mention or apply the burden-shifting framework of Celotex, the court at
least has some sense of the spirit of the burden-shifting frameworknamely, that the disposition of a motion for summary judgment relies on
the evidence parties have presented in a sort of "tennis match" of
evidence.
112.
113.

Langford v. Norris, 614 F.3d 445, 462 (8th Cir. 2010).
Boyland v. Corrs. Corp. of Am., 390 F. App'x 973, 975 (11th Cir. 2010).
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YES, THE COURT DISCUSSED THE PROFFER OF EVIDENCE IN
SUPPORT OR OPPOSITION TO THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT, IN ABSENCE OF REFERENCE TO CELOTEX:

Example:

"Apart from its amorphous allegations, White
Oak fails to explain adequately how the
challenged provisions permit arbitrary and
discriminatory
enforcement.
Accordingly,
White Oak's attempt to void the Zoning
Resolution, or portions thereof, for vagueness
fails. . . . White Oak assumes, without any

evidentiary support, that minorities will be
adversely affected

. ..

In addition, White Oak

cites no authority that a zoning prohibition
against
multi-family
developments,
particularly in a rural area, constitutes a per se
Equal Protection violation, and no such
authority exists.

. .

. As discussed previously,

White Oak had no protected property right in
its proposed development or in the TIF
District. Accordingly, the district court
properly granted summary judgment to the
Township on White Oak's federal civil
conspiracy claim." 1 4

114. White Oak Prop. Dev., LLC v. Wash. Twp., Ohio, 606 F.3d 842, 850 52, 855 (6th Cir.
2010).

